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ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well 
as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg 
outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become 
Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we show that Stackelberg leadership can emerge as equilibrium in a duopoly 
quantity setting game, where firms use corporate social responsibility (CSR) orientation along 
with profit maximization as a strategy to achieve higher profit and market share. The objective of 
this paper is to suggest an alternative explanation for emergence of Stackelberg leadership in a 
mixed duopoly. 
We explore this aspect in the spirit of Basu (1995), who demonstrated that Stackelberg 
equilibrium can emerge as an outcome in a managerial incentive duopoly game. He established 
that, in a managerial incentive duopoly game (as in Fershtman and Judd, 1987), if one of the 
owner delegates a contract with linear combination of sales and profit maximization to the 
manager, the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium can coincide with Stackelberg 
outcome, where delegated firm emerges as the leader.  
Our model in this paper differs from Basu (1995) in the following ways. First, instead of 
considering managerial incentive contracts, our focus remains on the strategic role of CSR 
activities of the firms. In the recent time, there is emergence of extensive literature on the non-
profit aspects of the firms and their impact on the market outcomes. There are various terms used 
for such non-profit orientation of firm such as non-profit commercial firms (Goering, 2008), 
consumer cooperatives (Kopel and Marini, 2014) and CSR oriented firms (Bian, Li and Guo, 
2016). We model CSR orientation of the firm using the weighted linear combination of profit 
and consumer welfare in the market (Goering, 2008). 
Second, we consider that though the firms are profit oriented, they strategically use CSR 
activities to show that they care about the consumers. We can also say that there is a distinction 
between owner and manager of the firm. While owner of the firm is concerned about profit, it 
delegates the product market decision making to manager for whom the objective function is a 
weighted linear sum of own profit and consumer welfare. The owner in first stage decides the 
weights (importance) being given to the component such that profit is maximized. This structure 
may seem counterintuitive in a way that if the owner is concerned about profit maximization, 
why does he delegate a semi-profit objective to the manager? But this type of behavior is not 
unheard off. Sometime it is optimal for the firm to not maximize the desired objective but a 
different objective which indirectly maximizes the desired outcome
2
.  We discuss these aspects 
of the game later.  
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 One such example is, Pal and Sharma (2013), where regional governments competing for mobile capital, always 
have a unilateral incentive to maximize tax revenue irrespective of whether they are concerned about social welfare 
or pure tax revenue. 
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2. The Model 
In a quantity setting duopoly, two firms (1 and 2) face the following inverse demand function: 
𝑝 = 𝑎 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2   (1) 
where 𝑎 > 0 and 𝑞1, 𝑞2 are quantity sold by the firms. The cost of production for a firm is 𝑐𝑞𝑖  for 
𝑖 = 1,2. The profit function of firm 𝑖(= 1,2) is as follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑞𝑖     (2) 
The corresponding consumer surplus is, CS =
1
2
(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)
2. Further, the CSR oriented objective 
function of the firm 𝑖(= 1,2) can we written as: 
𝐹𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖CS − 𝑍𝑖     (3) 
Here 𝛽𝑖 ∈ [0, ∞)3 is the relative weight assigned to profit and CSR orientation. 𝑍𝑖  denotes the 
fixed cost of CSR activities done by the firm, indicating that firms will have to incur some cost 
to convince the consumers and competitors that they are CSR oriented.  
The stages of the game are: 1) In the first stage, owner of the firm decides whether to engage in 
CSR or not, with the objective of profit maximization; 2) In the second stage, manager/owner 
decides level of output to be sold in product market. 
Before moving on to the solution, we need to understand a few points. In our game, use of CSR 
is of pure strategic nature without focusing on the welfare implications. Moreover, firms would 
consider engaging in CSR activities only if it leads to increase in their profit, otherwise they 
would not do this.  
Coming to solution of the game, we use backward induction method.  Given that firms are 
symmetric in nature, we would analyze it from the perspective of one firm and same follows for 
the other.   
Solving the second stage of the game, we assume CSR orientation (β) given and the CSR 
reaction function of firm 𝑖 (= 1, 2;  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) is: 
𝑞𝑖 =  
(𝑎−𝑐)−(1−𝛽𝑖)𝑞𝑗
2−𝛽𝑖
   (4) 
In (4), 𝛽𝑖 = 0  is the obvious case of Cournot reaction function. Further it is obvious that 
quantities are strategic substitutes and 𝛽𝑖 > 0 leads to outward shift in reaction function, making 
firm more aggressive in the product market competition. Getting the value of 𝑞1(𝛽1,𝛽2) and  
𝑞2(𝛽1,𝛽2), we move on to first stage of the game.  
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 We ignore the negative values for β for the obvious reasons. A negative value does not have a direct interpretation 
and explanation for the firm in the market. 
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In the first stage, there can be four different scenarios/cases where owners of the firms choose to 
CSR or not to CSR. We denote them by these pairs: {N, N}, {N, Y}, {Y, N} and {Y, Y}. Here 
"𝑁" denotes that firms choose not to do CSR activities and they are pure profit maximizers; 
whereas "𝑌"  denotes that firms choose to do CSR oriented activities and in product market 
competition they would optimize equation (3) mentioned above.  
Solving the first stage, first case {N, N}, is the obvious one i.e. Cournot competition and 
corresponding outcomes are: pNN =  
1
3
 a + 2c ;  𝑞1𝑁𝑁 = 𝑞2𝑁𝑁 =  
1
3
(a − c);   𝛽1𝑁𝑁 = 𝛽2𝑁𝑁 =
0; 𝜋1𝑁𝑁 = 𝜋2𝑁𝑁 =  
1
9
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2. Given that this is not our main focus, we would not discuss this 
in much detail. 
The second {N, Y} and third {Y, N} cases are of symmetric nature, so we discuss just one of 
them. Considering that firm 1 chooses for CSR activities and firm 2 does not, outcomes in 
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game are as follow
4
: pYN =  
1
4
 a + 3c ;  𝑞1𝑌𝑁 =
1
2
 a − c , 𝑞2𝑌𝑁 =  
1
4
 a − c ;   𝛽1𝑌𝑁 =
1
3
, 𝛽2𝑌𝑁 = 0; 𝜋1𝑌𝑁 =
1
8
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 − 𝑍1, 𝜋2𝑌𝑁 =
 
1
16
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2. This case is very interesting is a sense that the firm which engages in CSR activities 
get higher share of the market share than its competition along with relatively higher profit
5
. 
Moreover, though the firm is committing to CSR activities i.e. giving positive weight to 
consumer surplus in their objective function, they are able to generate higher profit. One 
plausible explanation for the same is this. Due to CSR orientation, firm becomes more aggressive 
in the product market competition and produces more than Cournot level of output. Given that 
quantity choice is strategic substitute in nature, the other firm reduces its output. Interestingly, 
we observe that firm 1 (CSR firm) has output and profit level equivalent to Stackelberg leader 
whereas firm 2 has outcomes of Stackelberg follower in the product market competition. 
 
Proposition 1:  Every firm has incentive to commit for CSR as a strategy. This leads to 
Stackelberg leader and follower outcome for the CSR and no CSR firms respectively. 
 
Given that every firm gains by committing for CSR, the last case {Y, Y} is analyzed next. 
Coming to the solution, we observe that,pYY =  
 −3+ 17 (𝑎+4𝑐)
1+ 17
;  𝑞1𝑌𝑌 = 𝑞2𝑌𝑌 =  
2(𝑎−𝑐)
1+ 17
;   𝛽1𝑌𝑌 =
𝛽2𝑌𝑌 =
1
4
 5 −  17 ;  𝜋1𝑌𝑌 =
 −3+ 17  𝑎−𝑐 2
9+ 17
− 𝑍1 , 𝜋2𝑌𝑌 =  
 −3+ 17  𝑎−𝑐 2
9+ 17
−  𝑍2 . Here we 
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 In these cases, the second order and stability conditions are satisfied if 𝛽𝑖 < 2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2. 
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 Here we make the assumption that cost of CSR activity,  𝑍1 <
1
16
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2, that is difference in the profit between 
firm 1 (CSR) and firm 2 (No CSR). We will analyze the threshold conditions of cost of provision of CSR activities 
in the coming section. 
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observe that when both the firms commit for CSR, both the firms produce more than Cournot 
case and generate lower profit. So if both the firms commit for CSR, this leads to worse 
outcomes for both. This creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation because there is unilateral private 
incentive of committing for CSR, but the final outcome is worse than non-commitment. We 
discuss this outcome in detail in next section. 
 
3. To CSR or not to CSR: Endogenous choice of CSR activities 
In this section, we analyze what are the possible feasible outcomes of the game, of four possible 
scenarios considered above.  
The structure of the game in stage 1 and corresponding pay-offs are depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Whether to CSR or not: Pay-off Matrix 
Firm 2 
No CSR (N) CSR (Y) 
Firm 1 
No CSR (N) 𝜋1𝑁𝑁 , 𝜋2𝑁𝑁  𝜋1𝑁𝑌 , 𝜋2𝑁𝑌 − 𝑍2 
CSR (Y) 𝜋1𝑌𝑁 − 𝑍1 , 𝜋2𝑌𝑁  
𝜋1𝑌𝑌 − 𝑍1 , 𝜋2𝑌𝑌
− 𝑍2 
 
First we check whether there is a dominant strategy for a firm or not. For firm 1, we observe that 
if 𝜋1𝑌𝑁 − 𝑍1 > 𝜋1𝑁𝑁  and 𝜋1𝑌𝑌 − 𝑍1 > 𝜋1𝑁𝑌 , then the dominant strategy is to “CSR”. In this 
game, the subgame perfect equilibrium would be {CSR (Y), CSR (Y)}, if  
0 < 𝑍1 <
1
72
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2  (5) 
0 < 𝑍2 <
1
72
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2  (6) 
Due to symmetric nature, we can say that if the cost of CSR for both the firms is below  
1
72
(𝑎 −
𝑐)2, then strategic choice of “To CSR” is the optimal condition. 
Proposition 2 (Prisoner’s Dilemma): Given that cost of CSR activities is below a threshold, 
1
72
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2,  the equilibrium of the game is “CSR, CSR” and the profit would be sub-optimal 
than “No CSR, No CSR”.  
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Proof: Using the proposition 1 and discussion above, both firms have “CSR” as their dominant 
strategy under symmetric costs. Therefore, the solution of the game is “CSR, CSR”. Further, we 
find that 𝜋1𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋1𝑌𝑌 , irrespective of the level of cost of CSR.  This indicates that equilibrium 
outcome is sub-optimal, leading to Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. QED. 
 
3.1 Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibrium 
Next, we explore the possibility of Stackelberg equilibria in this game, in the spirit of Basu 
(1995).  For that we need to satisfy two conditions for each firm: i) For Firm 1:  𝜋1𝑌𝑁 − 𝑍1 >
𝜋1𝑁𝑁, ii) For Firm 2:  𝜋2𝑌𝑁>𝜋2𝑌𝑌−𝑍2 (or vice versa). These conditions lead to: 
 
𝑖) 𝜋1𝑌𝑁 − 𝑍1 > 𝜋1𝑁𝑁  ⟹ 𝑍1 <
1
72
(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 
𝑖𝑖) 𝜋2𝑌𝑁 > 𝜋2𝑌𝑌 − 𝑍2 ⟹ 𝑍2 >
−57𝑎2 + 15 17𝑎2 + 114𝑎𝑐 − 30 17𝑎𝑐 − 57𝑐2 + 15 17𝑐2
144 + 16 17
 
To satisfy these two conditions simultaneously, 𝑍2 − 𝑍1 >
1
144
(−110 + 27 17)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2. If 𝑍2 
is sufficiently large than 𝑍1 , we can observe Stackelberg outcome in subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game
6
.  
 
Proposition 3 (Stackelberg Equilibria): A firm emerges as endogenous leader if there is 
sufficient CSR cost advantage over the other firm. 
 
Comparing this result with Basu (1995), we bring forth two main arguments.  
First, in Basu (1995), the firms were considered asymmetric in terms of their cost of production, 
whereas we consider cost of production to be same for both the firms. Basu (1995) argues that 
either cost of production asymmetry or cost of hiring a manager asymmetry is the key force that 
drives the Stackelberg outcome in the game. He demonstrates that if cost of production 
asymmetry exists then for positive but symmetric costs of hiring a manager, Stackelberg 
outcomes would be the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. 
                                                        
6 One point to be noted here is that if cost of CSR activity is same for both the firms, then emergence of Stackelberg 
solution is not possible. We have to introduce some sort of asymmetry between the firms to get Stackelberg 
outcomes for the game. 
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Second, since we consider that the cost of production is same for both the firms, subgame perfect 
equilibria corresponding to Stackelberg outcomes emerge from substantial difference between 
costs of engaging in CSR activities. A justification for different cost of CSR activities for firms 
can be given in terms of matching of their real and pseudo goals. We can say that if the firm has 
an orientation for CSR activity and then uses it for strategic purpose, will have to incur lesser 
economic cost, as compared to another firm which has no orientation for it but still uses it for 
strategic advantage in the product market competition.  
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